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Child Does Not Testify at Trial?
INTRODUCTION
The critical. evidence against those accused of sexually abus-
ing children is supplied most often by the victims.' Yet, very
young victims may not testify against the defendant at trial for
a variety of reasons. A child may be found incompetent as a
I The only eyewitness is usually a child of tender years, therefore the
child's testimony is usually critical to the state'A case against the alleged
abuser. As one commentator observed, "[i]n abuse cases, the eyewitness
testimony of the youngster involved may be the only direct link between
the child and the offender; any other evidence is generally circumstantial
physical evidence that indicates only that abuse was committed."
Note, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: Must We
Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMi L. REv. 245, 245 (1985-86) [hereinafter Note, Competency
Requirement]; see Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual
Assault, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs (no. 2) 125, 129 (1984) ("There seldom are other witnesses
or corroborating physical evidence."); Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child
Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 CoLuM. L. Rnv 1745, 1749-50 (1983)
("Physical corroboration is rare, for the crimes committed are predominantly nonviolent
in nature.") [hereinafter Note, Comprehensive Approach]; Note, The Testimony of
Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HIARv. L.
Rnv. 806, 806-07 (1984-85) ("The child is usually the only witness to the crime.")
[hereinafter Note, Two Legislative Innovations]; Note, Can You Hear What I Hear9
Direction and Limitation on Allowable Hearsay Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
State v. Campbell, 22 Wiss mTrr L. REv. 421, 422 (1986) ("[N]o one else witnessed
the act.") [hereinafter Note, Can You Hear]; Note, Minnesota's Hearsay Exception for
Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, II Wm. MrrcHELL L. REv 799, 802 (1985) ("[C]hild
victims are usually the only witnesses to sexual abuse.") [hereinafter Note, Minnesota's
Hearsay Exception]; Comment, An Overview of the Competency of Child Testimony,
13 N. Ky. L. REv. 187, 187 (1986) ("[T]he child victim is usually the only witness, and
often there is no physical evidence for the court to rely upon.") [hereinafter Comment,
Overview].
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witness because of lack of memory2 or lack of testimnomal ca-
pacity due to age.3 Children may also be unavailable as witnesses
because they refuse to testify,4 have retracted5 an original report, 6
suffer "from a mental illness or infirmity, ' 7 or because there is
2 See, e.g., Ellison v. Sachs, 583 F Supp. 1241 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d
955 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Slider, 688 P.2d 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
3 See State v. Gitchel, 706 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), in which a
three year old was found incompetent to testify because:
at the pretrial hearing, R was "squrming, looking around, hiding her face,
closing her eyes, making grimaces and really nothing of substance could
be obtained from her by way of testimony." Although R was able to
receive just impressions and relate them truly when she made the state-
ments, she was not able to do so in the atmosphere of a courtroom several
months after the event.
See also Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1052 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984) (finding four year old incompetent to testify
because "the child continuously stated that she would not tell the truth"); State v.
Supenor Court, 719 P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (the court noted the trial
court's conclusion that a three year old " 'is not competent to testify in this matter as
she appears unable to receive just impressions of the facts and to relate them truly. It
appears also that she cannot appreciate the oath taken by a witness.' "); Oldsen v.
People, 732 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Colo. 1986) (noting that trial court found the five year
old " 'is incapable of understanding the nature of an oath and receiving accurate
cognitive impressions; and that she is too young to communicate and relate circumstances
of her life factually' "); W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 178 n.1 (Colo. 1984) (deter-
mining that three year old was incompetent to testify because she "did not know what
'to tell the truth' meant"); Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1980) (stating
that child of two years and ten months was incompetent and thus "unavailable as a
witness due to her age"); People v. Lewis, 498 N.E.2d 1169 (II1. App. Ct. 1986), appeal
denied, 505 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2487 (1987) (finding six year
old unqualified to testify because she could not take the oath, said she did not know
her last name, and refused to speak up in answering questions); State v. Taylor, 704
P.2d 443, 447 (N.M. App. Ct. 1985) (ruling three year old incompetent to testify
"because his communication skills were nil"); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 723
(Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984) (A four year old child was -found
incompetent because "[s]he could not respond to questions, presumably because of
shyness and awe."). But see State v. Frey, 718 P.2d 846, 848 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding six year old "should not be permitted to testify because she was unable to
understand the significance of the oath," but she was not incompetent).
4 See State v. Rodreguez, 657 P.2d 79 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).
See generally Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome, 7
C= ABusE & NEGLECT 177, 188 (1983) (identifying retraction as the last stage of a
syndrome believed to be typically suffered by child victims of sexual abuse).
6 See State v. Griffith, 727 P.2d 247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
7 People v. Stritzinger, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434, 668 P.2d 738, 741 (Cal. 1983).
The court reversed the defendant's conviction in this case because of inadequate proof
that the 14 year old victim's " 'mental, emotional and physical condition rendered her
ability to testify' " relatively impossible and not merely inconvenient. Id. at 440, 668
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a "substantial likelihood of severe mental harm to the child if
[he is] required to testify in open trial proceedings." 8
When the child is found either incompetent or unavailable
as a witness, his or her out-of-court statements made to a
parent, 9 custodian, 10 police officer," social worker, 2 doctor, 13 or
others,14 are offered by the prosecution to prove both that the
crime occurred,' 5 and that the defendant was the perpetrator.'
6
These statements may be challenged under the rule prohibiting
the admission of hearsay evidence.' 7 Such challenges are often
P.2d at 747 (citation omitted); see Quinn, Competency to Be a Witness: A Major Child
Forensic Issue, 14 BuLL. Am. AcAD. PSYCmATRY L. 311, 319 (1986) (discussing post-
traumatic symptoms or disorganizng anxiety interfering with a child's competency as a
witness).
3 Perez v. State, 500 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (applying FLA.
STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b) (Supp. 1987): "Unavailability shall include a finding by the
court that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial
likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm. ").
An earlier decision recited open sympathy for an unavailable child witness: "Cer-
tainly a five year old girl should be spared the necessity of testifying against her father
in a rape case if at all possible." State v. Boodry, 394 P.2d 196, 199 (Ariz.. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 949 (1964).
9 See, e.g., Hopper v. State, 489 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 592 (1986) (statements to mother); Taylor, 704 P.2d at 443 (statements to mother
and stepfather).
0 State v. Vosika, 731 P.2d 449 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (statements to foster mother).
is See, e.g., Frey, 718 P.2d at 846.
32 See, e.g., State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587 (R.I. 1987).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981); State v Bounds, 694 P.2d 566 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); review denied,
705 P.2d 1157 (1985).
14 See, e.g., Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1050 (statements to nurse); People v. Mendeth,
503 N.E.2d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (statement to babysitter); Souder v. Commonwealth,
719 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1986) (statement to grandmother); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d
159 (S.D. 1984) (statement to teacher); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984)
(statement to aunt).
Is See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 231 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Mendeth, 503
N.E.2d at 1132.
1" See, e.g., W.C.L., 685 P.2d at 176; State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa
1983); State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1981).
11 The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as follows: " 'Hearsay' is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evrm. 801(c).
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules. " Id. at 802.
About half of the states have adopted the Federal Rules, or a substantially similar
version, regarding hearsay. See 4 J. WENsT=n & M. BERGER, WEINSTDN's EVIDENCE
801(a)-(c)[021, 802[03] (1985). Wigmore referred to the widely-accepted rule against
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
unsuccessful, resulting in the statements' admission into evi-
dence. The statements are admitted in one of three ways: 1)
under one of the traditional exceptions to the rule; 8 2) under
the residual rule;19 or 3) under a special statutory exception for
statements made by child victims of sexual abuse.20
When state and federal courts address the admissibility
of the hearsay on appeal, they are confronted with a variety
of issues: 1) whether incompetency or psychological una-
vailability provides a sufficient basis for meeting the una-
vailability requirement 21 of Ohio v Roberts;22 2) whether
established hearsay exceptions should be expanded to apply
to the unique characteristics of statements made by chil-
dren; 23 3) what are the "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" 24 under state versions of Rule 803(24)25
hearsay as "that most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence.
5 J. WiGmoRE, EVmENCE IN TRLks AT CommoN LAW § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
Two well known definitions of "hearsay" should be noted. One is
that "by 'hearsay' is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive
its value solely from the credit to be attached to the witness himself, but
rests also in part on the veracity and competency of some other person
from whom the witness has received his information."
The other asserts that the hearsay rule "is that rule which prohibits
the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony of the fact
asserted, unless the asserter is brought to testify in court on the stand,
where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his
assertion and of his qualifications to make it."
2 S. GARD, JoNEs ON EVIENCE § 8:1 (6th ed. 1972).
1R See infra notes 124-53 and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 25-26, 154-67 and accompanying text.
0 See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
- 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
2 See infra notes 133-36, 146-47 and accompanying text.
24 See mnfra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
2 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
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and 804(b)(5) 26 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and 4) how
reliability is determined for admission under recently enacted
or promulgated hearsay exceptions. 27
A review of these cases shows that one thing is clear: courts
and commentators have given inadequate scrutiny to the rela-
tionship between the reasons for the child's absence at trial and
the reliability required of his out-of-court statements to admit
them into evidence.2 This oversight is compounded when judges
presume that statements alleged to have been made by children
are inherently reliable.29 While the state has a strong interest in
convicting sexual abuse offenders,30 courts must strike a balance
between the welfare of the child and the preservation of the
accused's right to a fair trial.31
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
FED. R. EviD. 803(24); see 4 J. Wmism~n & M. BEROER, supra note 17, at 803(24)[02]
for state adaptations.
26 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having eqmvalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for wich it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
FED. R. Evm. 804(b). See 4 J. WmnisT-ni & M. BERGER, supra note 17, at 804(b)(5)[02]
for state adaptations.
" See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
23 See mfra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
"0 "mhe function of the court must be to pursue the transcendent goal of
addressing the most permcous social ailment which afflicts our society, family abuse,
and more specifically, child abuse." Goldade, 674 P.2d at 725.
11 Note, Competency Requirement, supra note 1, at 245-46.
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This Comment focuses on the manner in which the courts
have addressed questions of the adrmssibility of hearsay state-
ments by child victims of sexual abuse when the child has not
testified. 32 Cases decided after the 1980 decision of Ohio v.
Roberts 3 receive particular attention because this case set the
prevailing standard 34 that courts use to determine whether the
admission of a particular out-of-court statement violates the
defendant's right to confrontation. s This Comment concludes
by recommending an approach that judges can use to determine
whether to, admit the extra-judicial declarations of unavailable
child witnesses. 36
I. COMPETENCY AND CHILD WITNESSES
To determine what bearing a child's competency may have
on the reliability of his or her hearsay statements, the critena
from the jurisdiction's competency requirements which the child
failed to meet must be identified. Like any other potential wit-
ness, a child must possess the capacity to perceive, recollect,
narrate, and tell the truth.37
The Supreme Court has held that "there is no precise age
which determines the question of competency ",38 About half the
32 The admission of out-of-court statements by declarants who do testify at trial
is beyond the scope of this Comment. "When the declarant is available to testify at
trial, the [Supreme] Court has consistently found hearsay evidence admissible, reasoning
that the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the content of out-of-court
statements sufficiently tests their reliability." Note, Two Legislative Innovations, supra
note I, at 810 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973); Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1971); Califorma v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-61 (1970)).
31 448 U.S. at 56.
34 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
31 "In all crimnal prosecutions, the accused shall have the nght to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The nght of confron-
tation is "a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
36 See infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
31 "The competency of a witness to testify regarding a particular matter requires
a mmmum capacity to observe, record, recollect, and recount, an understanding of the
duty to tell the truth, combined with evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual
personal knowledge of the matter." M. GRAmn,., EvImENcE TaxT, Ru.Es, IIIUSTRATIONS
AND PROBLEMS 31 (1983); see 2 J. WiGoioiu, supra note 17, at § 505.
11 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895); see State v. R.W., 514 A.2d
1287, 1290 (N.J. 1986) ("age per se cannot render a proposed witness incompetent"); 2
J. Wimoon, supra note 17, at § 505 ("no rule defines any particular age as conclusive
of incapacity") (emphasis in original).
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states still statutorily define the age39 above wluch a presumption
of competency to testify operates. 40 Below that age, courts4' will
consider:
(1) Present understanding of the difference between truth and
falsity and an appreciation of the obligation or responsibility
to speak the truth (sometimes phrased as an understanding of
the nature and obligation of an oath);
(2) Mental capacity at the time of the occurrence in question
to observe or receive accurate impressions of the occurrence;
(3) Memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of
the observation; and
(4) Capacity to communicate or translate into words the mem-
ory of such observation and the capacity to understand simple
questions about the occurrence. 42
As the rest of the states have adopted43 a variation of Rule
60144 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, they have been consid-
ered by some to have abolished the common law competency
" Melton, Competency of Children as Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases [sic], m
PROTECTION OF ABusED VICTIMs: STATE LAWS & DECISIONS 115 (J. Sloan ed. 1982)
(noting that most states use the age of 10 or 14). ,
40 See 2 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 17, at § 488 for the text of state competency
statutes.
4" The question of a child's competency as a witness may be determined
either from a preliminary examination or from his testimony before the
jury or from both. Usually the child's competency is determined prelimi-
narily by the court.
The competency of a child of tender years as a witness is left to the
discretion of the trial judge, and will be sustained if the appropriate
standard has been satisfied.
2 C. ToRcIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 360 (14th ed. 1986).
42 NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER TOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION,
YouNG LAWYERS DIVISION, AmERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IM-
PROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SExuAL ABusE CASES 30 (J. Bulkley
Rptr. 1982) [hereinafer NAT'L LEGAL REsouRcEs CENTER, RECOMMENDATIONS]; see, e.g.,
State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 415-16 (Mo. App. 1979).
41 Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse Law
Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV 5, 7-8 & n.11 (1985-86); see 3 J.
WEINsTEm & M. BERGER, supra note 17, at § 601[06] ("State Adaptation of Rule 601").
" "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules." FED. R. E'vm. 601.
1987-88]
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requirement. 45 In fact, when read with Rule 6024 and Rule 603, 4 7
Rule 601 requires at least that a witness have personal knowledge
of the matter about which he testifies, and the capacity to
understand the duty to tell the truth.4
A few courts appear to be easing the competency requirement
for children,49 and commentators support this trend. 0 The better
41 "A trend is developing in state statutes to abolish the competency requirement
for children by adopting Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." NAT'L LEGAL
RESOURCES CENTER, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 42, at 30.
- "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EviD. 602.
- "Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so." FED. R. EVD. 603.
41 Several commentators have interpreted Federal Rules 601-603 to require further
that the witness "have the capacity to accurately perceive, record, and recollect mipres-
sions of facts (physical and mental capacity)," and "the witness possess the capacity to
express himself clearly." M. GRAHAwM, supra note 37, at 30; see 3 J. WEnsTmiN &
BERGER, supra note 17, at § 601[01] (noting it "would probably be more accurate to
say that the court will decide not competency but mimmum credibility"); Note, Com-
petency Requirement, supra note 1, at 251-52 (citing M. GRAHAM).
4 See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 719 P.2d 283, 286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986):
Flexibility is the key to determimng the competency of very young children.
A pre-school-aged child generally does not understand abstract concepts
such as oath, duty, truth or lie. A child's testimony may be rambling and
disjointed, characterized by lack of continuity, spotty memory, and an
inability to discuss specific dates and times. Those failings, however, go to.
the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given the testimony, not
to competency.
See Comment, Liberalization in the Admissibility of Evidence in Child Abuse and Child
Molestation Cases, 7 J. Juv L. 205, 207 (1985) (noting the trend to respect the trial
court's discretion in competency determinations).
-' A rational view of the peculiarities of child nature, and of the daily
course of justice in our courts, must lead to the conclusion that the effort
to measure a prion the degrees of trustworthiness m children's statements,
and to distinguish the point at which they cease to be totally incredible
and acquire suddenly some degree of credibility, is futile and unprofitable.
The desirability of abandomng this attempt and abolishing all grounds of
mental or moral incapacity has already been noted, in dealing with mental
derangement. The reasons apply with equal or greater force to the testi-
mony of children. Recognizing on the one hand the childish disposition to
weave romances and to treat imagination for verity, and on the other the
rooted ingenuousness of children and their tendency to speak straightfor-
wardy what is in their minds, it must be concluded that the sensible way
is to put the child upon the stand to give testimony for what it may seem
to be worth.
2 J. WioMoRE, supra note 17, at § 509 (emphasis added, reference omitted); see NAT'L
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view, however, recogrnzes that "[t]here are dangers inherent in
allowing a truly incompetent child to testify "5, But, as Wigmore
noted, generalizations about all children's capacity to testify are
questionable.5 2 Current research challenges old notions53 about
the untrustworthiness of children as witnesses. 54 While young
children are found to have problems with certain aspects of
LEOAL RESOURCE CENTER, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 42 ("Child victims of sexual
abuse should be considered competent witnesses and should be allowed to testify without
prior qualification in any judicial proceeding."); D. WHmTcomB, E. SAmO, & L.
STELLWAGEN, WHEN TrIE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 115
(1985) (recommending "establishing a presumption that every witness is competent
and leaving the determination of credibility to the trier of fact"); Bulkley, Evidentiary
and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645, 648" (1985) ("[A]lthough efforts should be
made to protect children, efforts also should be directed to treating them equally as
adults, where appropriate. Reform laws abolishing competency requirements for children
often reflect such an attitude.").
,1 Note, Competency Requirement, supra note 1 at 283-84.
It is hardly fair to the defendant to have some unknown individual, so to
speak, pulling the strings of an incompetent witness. It is not necessary to
totally abandon competency requirements. It would be preferable for the
courts to properly apply the relevant competency criteria to each and every
witness, no matter how young, carefully distinguishing between testimony
that reflects on credibility and testimony that reflects on competency
Children today are much brighter and receive education much earlier than
children did when competency statutes were first used [I]f the child
is truly incompetent, we should not sanction admission of the child's
testimony; because that would be the same as putting a puppet on the
stand.
Id., see Cross v. Commonwealth, 77 S.E.2d 447, 452 (Va. 1953) (finding 6 year old
incompetent as a witness because she "was not testifying from her independent knowl-
edge of what occurred, or from the impressions she received, but was merely reciting
the story that her mother had told her to tell").
,2 See 2 J. WiGxmoRE, supra note 17, at § 509, at 719.
1, See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1945):
Very young children often fail to distinguish between subjective and ob-
jective experiences, between events which they dream or imagine and events
which happen in the external world. They often fail to realize the impor-
tance which adults attach to this distinction and the consequences which
innocent failure to draw it may produce. They know little or nothing of
the effects which their recitals may have upon the liberty and reputation
of others.
See generally Note, Are Children Competent Witnesses?: A Psychological Per-
spective, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 815, 829 (1985) (reviewing empirical studies and concluding
that strict application of competency rules results in preventing "the admission of highly
reliable and relevant testimony").
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observation, 5 memory, 56 suggestibility, 57 succeptibility to leading
51 Id. at 820. Children may report less detail, unless the child is "more familiar
with a particular event" than an adult would be, and "[c]hildren are more likely to
answer correctly questions about central actions than questions about penpheral infor-
mation or about the culprit's description." Goodman & Helgeson, Child SexualAssault:
Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 181, 186 (1985-86); see Chance
& Goldstein, Face-Recognition Memory: Implications for Children's Eyewitness Testi-
mony, 40 J. Soc. Issuas (no. 2) 69, 82-83 (1984) (concluding that "identification accuracy
increases with age"- " .[f]ace recognition of familiar faces under conditions that
permit a clear view of the whole face is quite good, even in children as young as 6
years"; "[b]nefly seen, disguised, and previously unfamiliar faces are poorly rec-
ogmzed by children under 10 years"; the length of time between observation and recall
effects accuracy of identification; many other factors need additional research) (emphasis
in original).
56 "There is considerable evidence that children typically recall less than adults."
Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's
Memory, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs (no. 2) 33, 34 (1984). But available evidence does not
necessarily support the assertion "that forgetting occurs more rapidiy in children." Id.
at 36. But see Note, Comprehensive Approach, supra note 1, at 1750 ("[S]ince a child's
memory fades rapidly over time, the account given closer in time to the actual event is
the one more likely to be accurate.").
17 Children are sometimes believed to have particularly malleable memories. See,
e.g., Herzog, Child Sexual Abuse Defense: Pre-trial Investigation, Experts, and Proxy
Testimony (pt. 3) 11 TE CahmipoN Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 10, 10 ("Prosecutors have sought
to circumvent the unreliability, short memories, and suggestibility of small children by
making an end run around these problems by use of adult proxies.") (emphasis added).
While evidence supports the conclusion that children may be more suggestible, compar-
isons with research about adult suggestibility yield interesting results:
Apart from actual memory loss, developmental differences in the
ability to retrieve information could also lead to age differences in individ-
ual degrees of suggestibility. If, in general, children have greater difficulty
than adults in retrieving information from long-term mamory [sic]-and
there is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that they do-perhaps children
would be especially prone to rely on new (retrievable) information in their
reports. The new information would simply be more accessible. One source
of new information would be suggestive questiomng. If retrieval failures
can account for heightened suggestibility in children, the report of new but
incorrect information might occur even though some of the original mem-
ory fragments were still intact. According to this conception, greater sug-
gestibility of children could arise from developmental differences in the
retrieval stage.
But other considerations lead to the prediction that children may at
times be less suggestible than adults. Efficient information-processing often
involves the ability to integrate diverse pieces of information. Occasionally
this involves the generation of inferences that go beyond what is explicitly
presented. Sometimes the integration process, which usually serves us quite
well, leads to the creation of inaccurate memories. If children are less
efficient at integrating information or less likely to generate inferences
spontaneously, then they may also be less suggestible. More generally, it
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questions,58 and confusion of fact and fantasy, 59 findings do not
show conclusively that these shortcomings are significantly more
severe in children than adults.60
Some of the weaknesses of a witness' testimony are exposed
upon cross-examination. 61 While children can be intimidated
is well established that people's learning and remembenng is strongly
affected by what they already know. Such knowledge-dependency could
mean that children may not process postevent inputs as efficiently, and
would thus be less influenced by them.
Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. Issuas (no. 2) 51,
54-55 (1984). "Adults tend to be more suggestible when an authoritative rather than a
non-authoritative person asks leading questions. Young children may be especially subject
to suggestion simply because so many people (older children and adults) are generally
authoritative in relation to them." Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and
Future Directions for Research and Legal Practice, 40 J. Soc. Issu s (no. 2) 157, 161
(1984).
1' There is some evidence that "with simplified forms of leading questions, children
may be especially vulnerable." Loftus & Davies, supra note 57 at 61. "No clear
developmental trend emerges, however, from recent studies on the effects of leading
questions." Id. at 62.
51 While many examples of children's confusion between fantasy and reality
have been described by Piaget and others, there is not much evidence
comparing children with adults, and we know that adults too sometimes
confuse fact and fantasy.
However, based on available laboratory studies, children do not seem
more likely than adults to make such confusions. The importation into
memory of erroneous information is usually based on extensive prior
knowledge or preconceptions, that children may not possess or make use
of.
Johnson & Foley, supra note 56, at 38-39. But "young children did have particular
difficulty discriminating what they had done from what they had only thought of doing."
Id. at 45.
6 See supra notes 55-59; see also Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 55, at 190 -
(concluding that "children can provide accurate testimony if questioned properly");
Johnson & Foley, supra note 56, at 45 (noting that "[flew developmental studies
motivated by an interest in children's competence to testify have compared children and
adults under equivalent circumstances").
11 "It is not doubtful that on cross-examination, so far as feasible by mere
questions, the witness' physical capacity to observe (by sight, hearing, or the like) may
be tested." 3A J. WiaMoRE, supra note 17, at § 993 (emphasis in original).
Every witness must have had some fair opportunity to observe the matter
to which he testifies. The circumstances, therefore, which indicate that his
opportunities of acquiring knowledge were less full and adequate than they
nght have been are always relevant to diminish the weight of his testimony:
(1) That these inquiries may be made on cross-examination is un-
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through this process,6 2 defense counsel is not insensitive to the
problem. 3 Furthermore, it is within the power of the court to
control cross-examination to protect the witness.64
Despite greater receptivity toward child witnesses, 65 young
children may still be found incompetent as witnesses. 6 When
the prosecution offers a child's extra-judicial statements in place
of the child's testimony, the competency determination continues
to be pertinent to the admissibility of the hearsay 67
II. Tiim HEARSAY ALTE NATIvE
Children may not only be disqualified for a lack of testi-
momal capacity, they also may be unavailable as witnesses for
doubted.
Id. at § 994 (emphasis in original). "Subject to the general principle that the trial court's
discretion controls, the testing of a witness' capacity of recollection by cross-examination
upon other circumstances, even unconnected to the case in hand, is a recognized and
common method of measuring the weight of testimony." Id. at § 995 (emphasis m
original).
"The defendant's counsel often tries to intinudate the young witness m an
attempt to discredit the testimony. As a result of intimidation, the child is likely to
become sullen and uncommunicative on the stand." Note, Competency Requirement,
supra note 1, at 283.
A problem area in defending a child abuse case is identified: "How does the
criminal defense attorney effectively handle the complaintant on cross-examination with-
out increasing for her the jurors' sympathy and acceptence. .?" Heeney, Coping With
"The Abuse of Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions" The Criminal Defense Lawyer's View-
point, 9 Tan CHAPioN Aug. 1985, at 12, 17
" Both the embarrassment and psychological trauma of a victim involved
in a sex-related crime are compounded when the victim is a child. A child
understandably may be hesitant or unwilling to volunteer specific testimony
concerning the actual elements of a sexual offense. These factors are all
circumstances which the trial court, m its discretion, may consider m
determining whether or not to permit leading questions to be asked of a
complaining witness in a sex-related crime.
State v. Jenkins, 326 N.W.2d 67, 70 (N.D. 1982); Tee Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687, 694 (1931) (recognizing the court's duty to protect the witness "from questions
which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or
humiliate um"); 2 C. ToRCmA, supra note 41, at § 379 (noting "Ithe trial judge must
make certain that the examination of witnesses is conducted reasonably and fairly");
Note, Competency Requirement, supra note 1, at 283 (recommending than when a child
has been intiudated during cross-examination, "the court should recess to allow the
child to talk with parents or counsel and to regain composure before continuing to give
testimony").
"5 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
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other reasons, 68 including a finding that they would suffer psy-
chologically by testifying. 69 These concerns have prompted pro-
secutors to "attempt to circumvent proof problems in child
sexual abuse cases by entering the victim's out-of-court state-
ments through the testimony of another." 70 This practice gives
rise to defense challenges to the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence.
" See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
6See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 618 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting trauma, embarrass-
ment, humiliation, and "risk of severe psychological damage caused by having to relate
the details of the crime in front of a crowd" at trial); Altmeyer v. State, 496 N.E.2d
1328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality and application of IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-4-6(c)(2)(i) (1986 Supp.): videotape testimony admissible if "[t]he child
testifies at the trial; or [i]s found by the court to be unavailable as a witness because a
psychiatrist has certified that the child's participation in the trial would be a traumatic
expenence for the child. ").
"Vulnerability due to immaturity, coupled with the nature of the sexual crime
itself, increases the likelihood of trauma to the child during the legal process." Comment,
Children's Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases: Ohio's Proposed Legislation, 19 AKRON
L. REv. 441, 443 (1985-86); see also Pierron, A Comparative Analysis of Nine Recent
State Statutory Approaches Concerning Special Hearsay Exceptions for Children's Out-
of-Court Statements Concerning Sexual Abuse, m PAPERS FROM A NATiONAL PoLicy
CONFERENCE ON LEOAL R.FORMS i Cm D SExuAL AausE CASES 221, 228 (1985) (noting
" 'second vctimiation' "); Skolar, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of
Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSTHAL L. Ray. 1, 40 (1984) (noting that a growing body of
"empirical data, case studies and increasingly sophisticated 'fireside inductions', how-
ever, suggests that child sexual assault victims are in fact traumatized by the experience
of testifying. "). But see Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 1, at 135 noting that:
[Tihe experience of testifying in court can have a therapeutic effect for the
child victim. The child can learn that social institutions take children
seriously. Some children report feeling empowered by their participation
in the process. Some have complained, when the offender pled guilty, that
they did not have an opportunity to be heard m court.
Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psycholegal Dilemma, 40 J. Soc.
IssuEs (no. 2) 109, 110 (1984) (noting "there is little direct evidence" of trauma).
70 Note, Can You Hear, supra note 1, at 422; see Herzog, supra note 57, at 40;
Skolar, supra note 69, at 40 ("One of the primary rationales for the new hearsay
proposals is that most child victims are psychologically unavailable to testify, and that
they would be traumatized and psychologically damaged by the experience of having to
recount sexual abuse under normal courtroom conditions."); Note, Two Legislative
Innovations, supra note 1, at 807 (noting that the child victim "may be found incom-
petent to testify, or upon testifying may be unable to recall crucial details or to relate
them to the jury And parents sometimes decline to press charges rather than
subject their abused child to the ordeal of extended litigation requiring endless repetition
of a painful and best-forgotten episode.").
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The rule against hearsay71 is premised on the risks of un-
trustworthiness present m all testimony- "(1) perception, in the
sense of capacity and actuality of observation through any of
the senses, (2) recordation and recollection (sometimes called
memory), (3) narration (sometimes called ambiguity), and (4)
sincerity (sometimes called fabncation)." 72 Hearsay testimony is
suspect because it lacks the usual safeguards of testimomal evi-
dence-that it was made under oath, by a person present before
the trier of fact, and subject to cross-exanunation by the adverse
party 73
When the evidentiary need 74 and the trustworthiness7 5 of out-
71 See supra note 17.
7 M. GRanim, supra note 37, at 76-77.
71 Id. at 77.
The absent person, whose statement is offered in court, may not have been
under oath when he made the statement; there is no opportunity for the
opposing party at the present trial to cross-examine the absent person as
to the accuracy of the statement, Is ability to know the facts to which
the statement relates, and the existence-of bias, prejudice, error, misstate-
ment, or any of the other factors that would impeach the statement if
made in court; and the jury is unable to observe the appearance, demeanor,
and conduct of the absent witness as he makes his statement. Moreover,
there is danger that the present witness huniself may falsely state what he
was told by the third person. It is difficult to show that the present witness
was not truthful where the claimed author of the statement is not available
for examnation Further, in the case of an oral statement, it is probable
that the present witness is not restating it exactly as it was stated to him.
Because of a faulty memory or some other reason, a conscious or uncon-
scious rearranging of the words of the absent person may give the repeated
statement a significantly different meaning. It is because of these dangers
of error, perjury, and distortion that the law excludes hearsay evidence.
C. ToRcA, supra note 41, at § 257. "The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many
deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath
'the bare untested assertion of a witness may be best brought to light and exposed by
the test of cross-examination." 5 J. WmmoRE, supra note 17, at § 1362.
74 -The necessity principle:
implies that since we shall lose the benefit of the evidence entirely unless
we accept it untested, there is thus a greater or less necessity for receiving
it. The reason why we shall lose it may be one of two:
(1) The person whose assertion is offered may now be dead, or out of the
jurisdiction, or insane, or otherwise unavailable for the purpose of testing.
(2) The assertion may be such that we cannot expect, again, or at this
time, to get evidence of the same value from the same or other sources.
This appears more or less fully in the exception for spontaneous declara-
tions
5 J. WIOMORE, supra note 17, at § 1421 (emphasis in original).
" Trustworthiness "is in the nature of a practicable substitute for the ordinary
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of-court statements can be shown, they may be admissible under
an exception to the hearsay rule.76 Hearsay statements made by
child declarants may be deemed necessary evidence because the
child is unavailable or because the statements were made under
circumstances rendering them particularly reliable. 77 Even if the
court finds that the statements are admissible under a hearsay
exception, the defendant may also challenge their admissibility
as a violation of his right to confront hIs accusers. 78
III. UNAVAILABILITY AND CONFRONTATION
Because he cannot be cross-examined, the unavailable witness
raises concerns with the underlying rationale of both the hearsay
rule79 and the confrontation clause.80 The Supreme Court ad-
test of cross-examnnation. We see that under certain circumstances the probability of
accuracy and trustworthiness of [the] statement is practically sufficient, if not quite
equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional manner." Id. at § 1422.
7' See, e.g., supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; infra notes 125, 142, 171,
173 and accompanying text.
n See supra notes 74-75.
7, See supra note 35. In a recent decision holding that a defendant has no per se
right to be present at the competency hearing of a child witness, the Supreme Court
discussed the rationale behind the confrontation clause:
The Court has emphasized that "a primary interest secured by [the Con-
frontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination." The opportunity for
cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause, is critical for
ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process. Cross-examnnation is "the
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of
his testimony are tested "
The right to cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause,
thus is essentially a "functional" right designed to promote reliability in
the truth-finding functions of a crimnal trial. The cases that have arisen
under the Confrontation Clause reflect the application of this functional
right. These cases fall into two broad, albeit not exclusive, categories:
"cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements "
In the first category of cases, the Confrontation Clause is violated
when "hearsay evidence is] admitted as substantive evidence against the
defendan[t]," with no opportunity to cross-examne the hearsay declarant
at trial, or when an out-of-court statement of an unavailable witness does
not bear adequate indications of trustworthiness.
Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662-3 (1987).
7 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
$o See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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dressed this problem in Ohio v Roberts."' The Court explained
how "[t]he Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways
to restrict the range of admissible hearsay "82 The Court stated:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally re-
quires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his state-
ment is admissible only if it bears "indicia of reliability "
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."3
Although the Court did not define "unavailability," it did
recognize "a basic litmus of Sixth Amendment unavailability "14
" '[A] witness is not "unavailable" for purposes of the
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecu-
tonal authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his
presence at trial.' ",85 Unavailability has been viewed as a
-- 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
9 Id. at 65.
81 Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The Court, in its more elaborate explanation, based
its critena for unavailability on reasons supporting the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rule.
First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accu-
sation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual
case, the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the una-
vailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the
defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable.
Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the fact-finding
process l y ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse
evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trust-
worthiness that "there is no material departure from the reason of the
general rule. "
Id. at 65.
Id. at 74.
83 Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)) (omission and emphasis
in original); see Note, Confrontation and the Unavailable Witness: Searching for a
Standard, 18 VAL. U.L. Ray. 193, 195 (1983-84) ("If a hearsay statement was made by
a 'witness against' the defendant, the prosecution must make a reasonably intense effort
to produce the declarant at trial."). But see Altmeyer v. State, 496 N.E.2d 1328, 1331
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("It appears that where the prosecutor is seeking to prevent a
witness from having to testify in court because his participation would be traumatic for
him, the requirement that the prosecutor make a good faith effort to produce the witness
for trial would be incongruous ").
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requirement 6 for the admission of hearsay It has been construed
strictly 7 according to the definition in Federal Rule 804(a). 88 But
the Court recognized in Roberts that "[a] demonstration of
unavailability, however, is not always required."8' 9 Thus, the
" In other words, if the hearsay declarant is not produced for cross-
exaunation, a showing of unavailability will normally be required before
the hearsay will be constitutionally admissible.
The Court appeared not to recognize the sweeping potential ramifi-
cations of such an unavailability requirement. If broadly applied, it would
severely restrict the use by prosecutors of numerous hearsay exceptions
that have traditionally been available. The vast majority of hearsay excep-
tions, under both the common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence, do
not contain a requirement that the unavailability of the declarant be shown.
Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavail-
ability Requirement, 70 MiNN. L. Ra,. 665, 666-67 (1985-86) (emphasis added); see,
e.g., State v. Clark, 730 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) ("In Ohio v. Roberts,
the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether
adrmission of out-of-court statements of a witness who does not testify at trial violates
the defendant's right to confrontation.") (references omitted); accord Ellison v. Sachs,
769 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1985); Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1980); Com-
monwealth v. Bohannon, 434 N.E.2d 163 (Mass. 1982); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197
(Wash. 1984).
State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Iowa 1983); State v. Slider, 688 P.2d 538,
541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (construing WAsH. R. EviD. 8049(a)(3)-identical to Federal
Rule 804(a)(3)).
" Unavailability as a witness: includes situations in which the declarant -
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or (2) persists in
refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite
an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to a lack of memory of the
subject matter of the statement; or (4) is unable to be present or to testify
at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness
or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of Ins
statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or
other reasonable means.
FED. R. Evil. 804(a).
While unavailability is an aspect of the necessity principle at common law, see
supra note 74, it is a prerequisite to admissibility under only five categories of hearsay
statements according to the Federal Rules: former testimony, statement under belief of
impending death, statement against interest, statement of personal or family history,
and the residual rule. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1)-(5).
" Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) as an
example of when "the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it
did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness").
The Court also noted policy considerations it recognized in past decisions: "com-
peting interests, if 'closely examined,' may warrant dispensing with confrontation at
trial." Id. at 64. "Significantly, every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law
enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence
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lower courts were left with an ambiguous standard of unavail-
ability to apply. Six years later, the Court clarified its holding
by stating: "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the
radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be intro-
duced by the government without a showing that the declarant
is unavailable." 90
applicable in criminal proceedings." Id.
Remarking that the Roberts Court "had difficulty articulating the balance that
must be struck," Professor Kirkpatnck recommended the following criteria for deter-
rmnng exemptions from the unavailability requirement.
(1) Centrality-"[t]he utility of confrontation will vary depending upon
the extent to which the hearsay statement bears directly on the central
issues of the case."
(2) Reliability-"[t]o the extent a high degree of reliability can be indepen-
dently established, the utility of cross-examination is dinuished."
(3) Susceptibility to Testing by Cross-Examination-not all "hearsay is
equally susceptible to testing by cross-examination" (e.g., document cus-
todians).
(4) Adequacy of Alternatives to Cross-Exammation-"[c]ontradictory evi-
dence may be introduced, which, in some cases, may provide an even more
effective basis for challenge than cross-examination," and "a hearsay
declarant can be impeached by extrinsic evidence."
Kirkpatnck, supra note 86 at 681-85.
Professor Kirkpatrick noted that his "four criteria for assessing the utility of
confrontation are consistent with Dutton v. Evans." Id. at 686. In that case the
plurality found the hearsay evidence at issue was not " 'crucial' or 'devastating.' "
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87. The hearsay evidence was reliable because it was not an assertion
about past fact; the declarant had personal knowledge about the subject matter of the
declaration; there was little possibility of the testifying witness having faulty recollection;
and the declarant's statement was spontaneous and against Ins penal interest. Id. at 88-
89. Finally, cross-examination would have been of little value m this case. Id. The
Dutton plurality concluded that admission of the hearsay evidence was in keeping with
"the mission of the Confrontation Clause to advance a practical concern for the accuracy
of the truth determinig process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has]
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' " Id. at 89.
- United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394, 1126 (1986). The Court also explained,
however, that when the out-of-court testimony has no "independent evidentiary signif-
icance of its own," but is only a weaker substitute for live testimony, the unavailability
rule should apply. Id.
If the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to
the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination
and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little
justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the
same evidence are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay,
applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evi-
dence.
[VOL. 76
1987-881 ADMISSIBILITY OF A CHILD OUT-oF-COURT
Under the guiding principle that "the Confrontation Clause
normally requires a showing of unavailability," 91 state and fed-
eral courts have considered the admissibility of extra-judicial
statements by children who would not be testifying at trial. Most
have found incompetency or psychological unavailability satis-
factory to meet the Roberts unavailability critenon. 92 This simple
equation9 under the first prong of the Roberts "test" has al-
91 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
92 See Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 813 (Ariz. 1987)
(affirming tnal court's finding of unavailability because of existing mental infirmity
based solely on expert testimony "indicating the [child] would be uncommunicative if
asked about the assault and could be further traumatized by courtroom proceedings");
Lancaster, 615 P.2d at 723 (finding child unavailable as a witness due to age); Glendenmng
v. State, 503 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding special hearsay
statute with unavailability provision for absence due to substantial likelihood of severe
emotional or mental harm); Perez v. State, 500 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987);
People v. Lewis, 498 N.E.2d 1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2487
(1987); Altmeyer, 496 N.E.2d at 1329 (finding child unavailable, though competent,
because trial "participation would be a traumatic expenence"); State v. Jackson, 721
P.2d 232 (Kan. 1986); State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836 (Kan. 1985); Clark, 730 P.2d at
1104; State v. Gregory, 338 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Newbury v. State, 695
P.2d 531 (Okla. Crm. App. 1985); State v. Bounds, 694 P.2d 566, 568 (Or. Ct. App.
1985) (approving stipulation by state and defendant that child incompetent, and thus
unavailable, due to age); State v. Gitchel, 706 P.2d 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see
also Note, Minnesota's Hearsay Exception, supra note 1, at 815-17 (asserting that "[al
determination of incompetency constitutes unavailability within the meamng of the
hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause"); Comment, Sexually Abused Infant
Hearsay Exception: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 J. Juv LAW 59, 70 (1984) (concluding
that "child's incompetence or refusal to answer questions when on the stand does not
preclude such admission and can, therefore, be considered equivalent to legal unavaila-
bility") [hereinafter Comment, Sexually Abused]; cf. State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694,
706 (Or. 1985) (holding "that before any out-of-court declaration of any available
["unavailability" defined as in Federal Rule 804(a)] living witness may be offered against
a defendant in a criminal trial, the witness must be produced and declared incompetent
by the court"). But see Note, Two Legislative Innovations, supra note 1, at 818-19
asserting that
the state must demonstrate the impossibility of rn-court testimony to justify
frustrating the defendant's clear interests in confronting and cross-exam-
ining the witness since neither the likelihood of emotional trauma nor
the incompetency of the child makes it impossible for him or her to testify
in court, neither warrants a finding that the child is unavailable as a
witness.
(emphasis in original).
"1 Little or no analysis precedes the conclusion that incompetency/psychological
unavailability constitutes unavailability for confrontation clause purposes. See cases cited
supra note 92.
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lowed courts to dispose of the reasons for the declarant's absence
from the courtroom before applying the second prong, "indicia
of reliability "94 But a relationship between unavailability and
reliability may exist nonetheless. 95
IV RELIABLE ExTRA-nUmIcIAL STATEMENTS BY CHILDREN
The Supreme Court clarified the foundation for reliability
analysis in Lee v Illinois. 96 The interest in " 'accuracy in the
factfinding process,' "97 which is augmented by " 'ensuring the
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence,' "98 un-
derlies the confrontation clause, 99 as well as the rule against
hearsay and its exceptions.100 Therefore, " 'the Clause counte-
nances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that "there
is no material departure from the reason of the general
rule." ' ",0O Contrary to the majority view, a few courts have
found a direct relationship between a child's incompetency and
the reliability of his or her out-of-court statements offered into
evidence, 102 resulting in the exclusion of these statements.
9, See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
9 "It must be remembered that unavailability due to testimonial incompetency
also relates to the question of reliability, since the unavailability here is caused by the
lack of a requirement for being a witness. This highlights the conceptual problem we
deal with in the area of hearsay." Pierron, supra note 69, at 227.
106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063-64 (1986) (commenting on Ohio v. Roberts); see supra
note 78.
Id. at 2064 (citing Roberts).
" Id.
" Id.1' See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
"I Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064.
2 See State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587, 590 (R.I. 1987) ("[W]hen a trial justice has
ruled a witness incompetent to testify because the justice is not convinced that the witness
is capable of relating a capacity to observe, to recollect, to communicate, or to appreciate
truthfulness, the justice has already made the determination that the witness's [sic]
assertions are unreliable."); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 203 (Wash. 1984) ("The
declarant's competency is a precondition to admission of his hearsay statements as are
other testimonial qualifications.").
Applying the principle in Ryan, id., the Washington Court of Appeals found
hearsay statements of an unavailable witness admssible, distinguishing incompetency
from unavailability due to an inability to "understand the significance of the oath."
State v. Frey, 718 P.2d 846, 848 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). In Ryan, the child's statements
were found unreliable because the child's incompetency was "based on 'the inability [of
child witnesses] to receive just impressions of the facts concerning the event.' " Id. at
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An important distinction can be drawn between the compe-
tence of the witness and the competence of the evidence. A child
may lack testimonial capacity due to an inability to respond to
questions and testify as an adult under oath on the witness
stand, yet have had the requisite capacity to perceive, recollect,
narrate and tell the truth'0 3 at the time the statement was made.
While Wigmore observed that "admission of hearsay statements,
by way of exception to the rule, therefore presupposes that the
assertor possessed the qualifications of a witness in regard to
knowledge and the like,"'1 he also recognized an exception for
spontaneous exclamations'05 and indicated no special testimonial
qualifications for statements of a mental or physical condition.106
850 n.9. But see Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1986):
A finding that a child is incompetent to testify [because she appeared
incapable of relating just impressions of the facts] does not automatically
render inadmissible all hearsay statements of the child, as long as the
reliability of the statements is ensured by the circumstances bringing them
within the scope of an exception to the hearsay rule However, where
the asserted exception depends on the declarant's ability to understand the
purpose of questiomng and to relate accurate information, it is significant
that the declarant has been disqualified.
Id. at 1135 n.6. Justice Erickson filed a vigorous dissent, m which he argued that "the
basis for the victim's testimnomal incapacity appears to preclude a finding of equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness required for the purposes of determining admssibility
under CRE 803(23)." Id. at 1138 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
lo, See, e.g., Logsdon v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W 1067 (Ky. 1926).
Appellant's contention that incompetent evidence was permitted to go
to the jury upon the trial hereof cannot be sustained. He complains that
the mother of his 3 year old victim was permitted to testify that when she
returned to her home, where only appellant and her child were, the latter
said, "Mama, look what Bill has done to me." That testimony was
competent, though the child was of such tender years as to be incapable
of testifying herself.
Id. at 1067; see also Huff v. white Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 1979)
(finding in civil case that "unless the declarant was not mentally competent when he
made the statement, it should have been admitted. "); Ryan, 691 P.2d at 208 (Dim-
mick, J., concurring) (emphasizing "the distinction between the present and past com-
petence of a child witness. [A] determination of incompetency [to take the stand as
a witness] at the time of trial [does not] necessarily indicate that the child was incom-
petent at the time of making the hearsay statement"); cf. Reynoldson v. Jackson, 552
P.2d 236, 237 (Or. 1976) (finding 89 year old's statements offered in personal injury
case "inherently suspect" because of declarant's confusion at the time of making the
statement).
101 5 J. Wioioaa, supra note 17, at § 1424 (emphasis in original).
105 8 id. at § 1751(c)(1).
,,6 Id. at §§ 1714-1740.
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Further, he noted that "[t]he time of the utterance of the testi-
mony is ordinarily the time when the qualifications must exist
. .'"
07 Therefore, a statement made by a child who is found
incompetent as a witness could be admissible as competent evi-
dence.
On the other hand, the child may be found incompetent as
a witness for reasons relevant to the reliability of extra-judicial
statements. If so, the evidence is likewise incompetent. For ex-
ample, in State v Griffith'0 8 the court found error in the trial
court's admission of a child's statements when "the time, con-
tent, and circumstances surrounding the victim's hearsay state-
ments [did] not demonstrate adequate indicia of reliability "09
One of the factors the court considered was that the child had
alternately accused two different individuals of the crime, and
thus must have been lying about one of them.110 The trial court
had disqualified the victim from testifying in part because of
"the purported inconsistency between her accusations depending
on who asked the questions."I' When the reasons for the child's
incompetency cast doubt upon the hearsay statement's reliability,
admitting the statement compromises the court's interest in
4'accuracy in the fact-finding process.' 1112 Statements that are
both untrustworthy and untested by the defendant should not
be admitted." 3
"Whether a child's hearsay statement is accompanied by
sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness turns on
the facts of the case." 1 4 Yet, one of the most common features
of analysis is the assumption that statements about sexual abuse
by children are inherently trustworthy "5 Like other generaliza-
10 3 d. at § 483 (emphasis in original).
1-, 727 P2d 247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
,19 Id. at 254.
1(0 Id.
I' Id. at 251.
"' Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064 (quoting Roberts).
"3 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
"4 Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emergency
Issues in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAmI L. REv. 19, 53 (1985-86) [herein-
after Graham, Indicia].
"' Pierron, supra note 69, at 230; see Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 957 (4th Cir.
1985) (noting observations of several courts and commentators "that a young child's
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tions about children, 116 research findings are mixed.1 7 Evidence
that false accusations occur 1 s reveals the need to look more
description of a sexual assault may, in particular circumstances, contain its own inherent
verity"); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979) ("inherently
trustworthy under all the circumstances"); State v. D.R., 518 A.2d 1122, 1132 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("inherent reliability"), rev'd, No. 1988 WL 7996 (N.J.
1988); State v. McCaffety, 356 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D. 1984) ("unlikely to fabricate");
see also Comment, Sexually Abused, supra note 92, at 67 ("These statements are also
especially trustworthy. A young child is unlikely to fabricate a graphic account of sexual
activity because such activity is beyond the realm of his experience."); cases cited infra
note 132. But see State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983) (noting, with regard
to trustworthiness guarantees required under the residual rule: "Although there is sub-
stantial authority for the proposition that children are by nature innocent and inherently
trustworthy, almost all of these cases are based on the excited utterance exception
[where] [t]he foreign acts, in effect, speak through the child victim because Is or
her knowledge of them suggests a previous first hand experience with sex."); Note, Two
Legislative Innovations, supra note 1, at 820 (predicting that "the presumption that
children's reports of sex abuse are inherently reliable will become increasingly less valid
as children are more commonly instructed on the nature of sex abuse, advised to 'tell'
if it happens, and assured that if they tell they will be believed").
116 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
117 Whether out-of-court statements by children are intrinsically reliable
is questionable. Some courts and commentators hold that such statements,
standing alone, are trustworthy. Two justifications are commonly offered.
First, it is highly unlikely that children persist in lying to their parents or
other, figures of authority about sex abuse. Second, children do not have
enough knowledge about sexual matters to lie about them. In contrast,
other courts and commentators, focusing on the well-established tendency
of children to fantasize and tell stones, have concluded that these state-
ments are not inherently reliable.
Note, Comprehensive Approach, supra note 1, at 1751.
318 To make the question one of whether or not children lie about sexual
abuse is a nstake. To lie assumes deliberate, willful, and intentional
purpose and malice. Few children, indeed, are likely to have either the
competence or the balefulness to embark upon such a course, although
some adolescents may do so. Rather, given the plastic and malleable nature
of children the question is what degree, kind, and type of influence has
been exerted upon them. Again, it does not necessarily require a deliberate
and malicious intent on the part of an adult to trigger the kind of influence
that will result in shaping, molding, and essentially teaching a child to
produce a tale that is false. The essential engineering or fabrication of a
false allegation can result from intent to do good coupled with a precon-
ceived idea of what has happened, a lack of awareness of the susceptibility
of children to influence and a lack of understanding of the stimulus value
of adults.
H. WAxxamm & R. UNDEaWAGER, CHmD SExuAL ABUSE ALLEGU ONS: A CaRcAL
Rnvmw, 19, to be published (1987). Many allegations of sexual abuse arise out of
divorce, child custody and visitation disputes. Id. at 21. See also Goodwm, Sahd &
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critically at allegations of sexual abuse. 119
Rather than ignoring the relationship between unavailability
and reliability, 120 or drawing generalizations about children's
statements regarding sexual abuse,' 2 1 courts should consider the
basis for the child's incompetency or unavailability when it
undertakes reliability analysisi2 in each case. 123 In the following
Rada, Incest Hoax: False Accusations, False Denials, 6 BULL. Am. Ac~A. PSYCHIATRY
& LAW 269, 273 (1978) (recommending guidelines for psychiatnc investigation of incest
accusations, including, "[t]he investigator must be aware of his biases" and "should
take the position that he does not yet know what really happened"); Moss, Are the
Children Lying? 73 A.B.A. J. 58, 61 (May 1, 1987) (commenting on allegations of mass
sex abuse at day-care centers; noting that "repeated interviewing and discussions about
abuse undermine the credibility of witnesses"); Schuman, False Accusations of Physical
and Sexual Abuse, 14 BuLL. Am. ACAD. PSYCmATRY & LAw 5, 5 (1986) (discussing
seven cases of invalid reports of sexual abuse, and observing: "In some quarters there
is such degree of sensitivity or outrage about possible child abuse that a presumption
exists that such abuse has occurred whenever it is alleged. It is possible for a reserve
skew to evolve, in which incest or other child sexual abuse can be overperceived and
overalleged"); Underwager & Wakefield, Interviewing the Alleged Victim in Cases of
Child Sex Abuse: The Role of the Psychologist, 11 THE CHAMPION Jan.-Feb. 1987, at
17 (noting role conflict between investigative and therapeutic interviewing); Yates, Should
Young Children Testify in Cases of Sexual Abuse?, 144 AM. J. PsyCHIATRY 476, 476
(1987) ("Many accusations of sex abuse that occur in the course of custody disputes are
inaccurate The child can be drawn into a fabrication through devious means.").
119 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 721 P.2d 232, 237 (Kan. 1986) (applying statutory
requirement that " '[i]f the trial judge finds the child is "unavailable," he must deter-
mine, inter alia, that "the child was not induced to make the statement falsely by use
of threats or promises" ' ").
'2 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
121 See mfra note 115 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
123 See Graham, Indicia, supra note 114. Affirming a lower court ruling that an
incompetent five year old's out-of-court identification of the defendant was unreliable,
the Fourth Circuit noted that "obvious limitations in observation, expression and un-
derstanding of a five year old help to explain the various discrepancies in her descriptions.
But they also underscore the care with which courts must approach the question of
introducing such hearsay, particularly when largely untested by cross-examnation."
Ellison, 769 F.2d at 957. "Therefore, we agree with the district court that the basis for
Ellison's conviction is at odds with the values preserved by the confrontation clause-
to advance 'the accuracy of the truth determining process m criminal trials.' " Id.
See also, e.g., Brown, 341 N.W.2d at 15 (commenting on a boy's extrajudicial
statements made in response to questions: "although a finding of incompetence to testify
relates primarily to the potential witness's understanding of the oath, it also suggests a
lack of either the maturity or the mental capacity required to answer questions truth-
fully"); Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1986) (prefacing admis-
sibility considerations with "the fact that the declarant is incompetent or otherwise
unavailable to testify in itself is no basis for admitting hearsay evidence which does not
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sections, some of the approaches which courts have taken in
evaluating the reliability of hearsay statements will be examined
by category of hearsay exception.
A. "Firmly Rooted"'1 Hearsay Exceptions
Spontaneous Declarations: The vast majority of out-of-court
statements by unavailable child declarants are offered and ad-
mitted as spontaneous declarations.'2 The usual requirements
are: (1) a startling occurrence; (2) a statement made before there
has been time to fabricate and while reflective powers are "yet
in abeyance"; 12 and (3) the utterance must relate to the startling
event. 127
The need component is met because these statements have a
special connection to the exciting event. 12 Thus, their value is
superior to in-court testimony 129 Given this intrinsic evidentiary
characteristic, the competency of the declarant is not a prereq-
uisite to their admissibility 130
meet the requirements of a recognized exception to the hearsay rule"); Bishop v. State,
581 P.2d 45, 48 (Okla. Crnm. App. 1978) (ruling "that the fact a witness is ruled
incompetent to testify because of age does not by itself negate the independent indicia
of reliability which excited utterances possess"); State v. Doe, 719 P.2d 554, 558 (Wash.
1986) (The court stated "that a deternmnation of incompetency would not necessarily
make the statements unreliable. The trial court must determine whether extnnsic evi-
dence, or the nature of the comments themselves, make the child's statement sufficiently
reliable. The child's lack of competency may be a factor, but it is not controlling.").
124 See supra text accompanying note 83.
125 Spontaneous declarations encompass a number of distinct categories of hearsay
exceptions, but all recognize "spontaneity as the source of special trustworthiness." E.
Cs;y, McCoRmcK oN EVIDENCE § 288 (3d ed. 1984).
(I) Tins general principle is based on the experience that, under certain
external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement
may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their
control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and
sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced
by the external shock.
6 J. WiaMoRE, supra note 17, at § 1747.
126 Id. at § 1750.
127 Id.
In "mhe events themselves speak through the instinctive words and acts of the
participants." State v. Taylor, 704 P.2d 443, 454 (N.M. App. 1985).
129 See supra note 74.
10 6 J. WioMoRE, supra note 17, at § 1751(c)(11; Stafford, The Child as a Witness,
37 WAsH. L. REy. 303, 307 (1962); see Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720, 722-23 (Colo.
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If the requirements for spontaneous declarations are fulfilled,
reliability can be inferred because the statements are admitted
under "a firmly rooted hearsay exception."'' Further, children's
spontaneous declarations are considered particularly trustwor-
thy 13Z
Some proponents of special statutory hearsay exceptions 33
for child victims of sexual abuse complain that "[c]ourts have
... tended to stretch existing hearsay exceptions to accommo-
date a child victim's out-of-court statements because they are
deemed uniquely necessary and trustworthy. . [thereby threat-
ening] the destruction of the certainty and integrity of the ex-
ceptions."' 134 By the same token, commentators complain that
1980); People v. Lewis, 498 N.E.2d 1169 (11. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2487 (1987); State v. Pendelton, 690 P.2d 959 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Souder, 719 S.W.2d
at 730; Jackson v. State, 356 A.2d 299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Newbury v. State,
695 P.2d 531 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Bishop, 581 P.2d at 45; Griffith, 727 P.2d at
247; State v. Bloomstrom, 529 P.2d 1124 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). See generally Anno-
tation, Admissibility of Testimony Regarding Spontaneous Declarations Made By One
Incompetent to Testify at Trial, 15 A.L.R. 4TH 1043 (1982) (citing only a few older
cases m which admssibility was contingent on the child's competency to testify).
"3 See supra text accompanying note 83.
11 See Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (noting that
with a victim of tender age, it is "improbable that her utterance was deliberate and its
effect premeditated"); State v. Boodry, 394 P.2d 196, 199 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
949 (1964) (finding assault victim's age would " 'render it improbable that his utterance
was deliberate and its effect premeditated in any degree' " (citing Soto v. Territory,
infra this note)); Soto v. Territory, 94 P 1104, 1105 (Ariz. 1908); People m Interest of
O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 318 (Colo. 1982) ("The element of trustworthiness underscoring
the excited utterance exception, particularly in the case of young children, finds its
source primarily in 'the lack of capacity to fabricate rather than the lack of time to
fabricate.' ") (emphasis added); Lancaster, 615 P.2d at 723 (recognizing "that children
of tender years are generally not adept at reasoned reflection and at concoction of false
stones under these circumstances"); People v. Ortega, 672 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. App.
1983) (citing O.E.P and Lancaster, supra this note); People v. Mendeth, 503 N.E.2d
1132, 1141-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (stating "it is unlikely that a child of tender years
will have any reason to fabricate stones of attacks," but noting elsewhere that "the
reliability, and, therefore, adnussibility, of a spontaneous declaration comes not from
the reliability of the declarant, but from the circumstances under which the statement is
made"); State v. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (noting "charac-
tenstics of young children work to produce declarations 'free of conscious fabrication'
for a longer period after the incident than with adults").
113 See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
,,4 State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 842 (Kan. 1985); NAT'L LEGAL REsOURCE CENTER,
RECOmMENDATiONS, supra note 42, at 35; Skolar, supra note 69, at 7.
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reliance on spontaneity,135 and lapse of time between the event
and the statement 136 limit the usefulness of this exception.
The requirements1 37 focus on the excitement of the declarant
because this renders "the utterance spontaneous and unreflect-
ing.' ' 131 Courts disagree about the level of excitement required. 39
The statement need not be contemporaneous with the event, as
long as it is made at the first opportunity. 140 However, when
lapse of time is the reason for decining to admit the hearsay,
- The analytic framework of the spontaneous exclamation exception in
child sex abuse cases and the exception's criteria of trustworthiness are
built on the premise that the declarant has the psychology, behavior, and
experience of an adult and reacts accordingly. Invocation of the exception
in this context assumes that the rationale, criteria, and application of the
exception are identical for the statements of both children and adults. This
view, however, is unfounded. By treating child declarants as adults, the
exception fails to take into account the special circumstances surrounding
child sex abuse. It ignores the unusual need for child hearsay statements
and, in addition, fails to analyze properly their reliability.
Note, Comprehensive Approach, supra note 1, at 1755-56. The author claims that a
major weakness of this exception stems from "undue reliance of spontaneity as an
indicator of trustworthiness, to the exclusion of other equally valid indicia of reliability."
Id. at 1756. Most children "do not view a sexual episode as shocking," particularly if
it is an incestuous relationship. Id. The author recommends examimng the folowing to
determine accuracy of the statement:
circumstances such as the age of the child, his or her physical and mental
condition, the exact circumstances of the alleged event, the language used
by the child, the presence of corroborative physical evidence, the relation-
ship of the accused to the child, the child's family, school, and peer
relationships, and the reliability of the testifying witness.
Id. at 1758.
'3' Graham, Indicia, supra note 114, at 23-24.
"n See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
13 6 J. WicoMona, note 17, at § 1750.
13 Compare Alston v. United States, 462 A.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. 1983) (requirements
not met "when there is no evidence that the declarant suffered mental disturbance of
physical shock as a result of the event") and D.R., 518 A.2d at 1130 (finding that the
child's description of the sexual activity, "not accompanied by evident 'stress of nervous
excitement,' " did not meet spontaneous declaration requirements) and Brown, 341
N.W.2d at 13 (declimng to apply the exception to an out-of-court identification when
the victim was responding calmly to a question " 'calculated to elicit information which
would otherwise have been withheld' ") with Commonwealth v. Fuller, 506 N.E.2d 852,
855 (Mass. 1987) (finding that "whether children manifest excitement or hysteria when
they make a statement is not determinative whether the child is reliably reporting a
traumatic event").
1,0 See Lancaster, 615 P.2d at 722-23; People v. Watson, 438 N.E.2d 453, 456-57
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Pendelton, 690 P.2d at 964.
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courts also note that persistent or leading questions were used
to elicit the child's statements. 141
Statements Made for Purposes of Medical Treatment: An-
other well-established hearsay exception permits admission of
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment. 42 Here, reliability is assured not by spontaneity, but "by
the likelihood that the patient believes that the effectiveness of
the treatment he receives may depend largely upon the accuracy
of the information he provides the physician.' '1 43 Contempora-
neous statements of bodily condition are considered competent
evidence, 144 which may be more informative than courtroom
testimony When such statements are properly admitted under
this exception, reliability can be inferred "without more. ' 14
Like statements admitted under the spontaneous declarations
exception, statements of children that are admitted under the
medical diagnosis or treatment exception are sometimes seen as
"torturing" the exception by stretching it "beyond its intended
scope."' 146 The perceived barriers to admitting children's state-
ments under this exception are: how the identity of the perpe-
trator is pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment, and whether
the statements carry the same trustworthiness when made by
someone who is not "aware of the importance of telling the
truth to a doctor in order to secure proper medical care."' 47
Following the Eighth Circuit's lead in United States v Iron
Shell, 41 a number of courts have found statements to doctors
141 See Griffith, 727 P.2d at 252 ("suggestiveness of the questions"); State v. Slider,
688 P.2d 538, 543 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) ("leading nature of the questions"); Souder,
719 S.W.2d at 734. But see Paster, 524 A.2d at 590 ("responsive nature of the state-
ments"); Doe, 719 P.2d at 554.
142 See, e.g., FED. R. EvlD. 803(4): "Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."
' E. CiARY, supra note 125, at § 292.
14 6 J. WiMoRE, supra note 17, at § 1718.
", See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
146 Datesman, Evidence, State v. Smith: Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay
Statements in Child Sex Abuse Cases, 64 N.C.L. R-v. 1352, 1362 (1985-86).
"7 Graham, Indicia, supra note 114, at 24-25.
1- 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
[VOL. 76
1987-88] ADmiSSIBILITY OF A CHILD OUT-OF-COURT
identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse pertinent to medical
diagnosis and treatment. 149 In those cases, courts seem to review
carefully the child's awareness of the importance of truthful-
ness.
50
In conclusion, courts usually fail to consider the reason for
the child's unavailability to testify to be probative of the relia-
bility of hearsay statements offered under traditional hearsay
exceptions. As long as the statements meet the requirements for
application of the spontaneous declarations exception,' 5 ' this
oversight is probably consistent with the rationale for the excep-
tion.5 2 But, if the basis for the child declarant's unavailability
relates to his or her ability to receive and relate accurate cognitive
impressions, and that inability was present both at the time of
the event and when making subsequent statements for medical
treatment, the statements are inadmissible. 53
"4 "It is important to note that the statements concern what happened rather than
who assaulted her." Id. at 84. "Statements as to fault would not ordinarily qualify. "
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(4), 53 F.R.D. 183, 306 (1973). See United States
v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985); People v. Wilkms, 349 N.W.2d 815, '817
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding statements admissible because identification of assaillant
pertinent and necessary to psychiatric treatment); State v. Vosika, 731 P.2d 449, 452
(Or. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Bouchard, 639 P.2d 761, 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982);
Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 725-26 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984); see
also Moore, The Medical Diagnosis and Treatment Exception to Hearsay - The Use of
the Child Protection Team in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 13 N. Ky. L. REv. 51
(1986) (recommending conditions under which statements to non-medical personnel in
multidisciplinary hospital child protection teams should be admssible under medical
exception); Note, Evidence-Hearsay-Child Abuse and Neglect-A Child's Statements
Naming an Abuser are Admissible Under the Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 53 U. CN. L. Rnv 1155 (1984) (commenting on Goldade, supra
this note, with approval).
110 See State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 809 (Ariz. 1987) (reasomng that because
"sexually abused children may not always grasp the relation between their statements
and receiving effective medical treatment [i]t is particularly important, therefore, to
ask whether the information sought by the treating doctor was reasonably pertinent to
effective treatment"); W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 181 (Colo. 1984) (refusing to
admit statement under medical exception because the child was too young to understand
the need to be truthful, and the child was referred to the doctor not for medical
treatment "but for confirmation of child abuse as a step in law enforcement proceed-
ings").
1 See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
152 See supra note 125.
"I Oldsen, 732 P.2d at 1138-39 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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B. The Residual Rule
Many jurisdictions recognize the catch-all exception 54 to the
hearsay rule. Courts turn to this exception when extra-judicial
statements by children are not admissible under an established
exception. 55 As the exception is not "firmly rooted,' '5 6 courts
must consider independently the reliability of the statement be-
fore admitting it. 1 7 Because the residual rule contains reliability
11 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
"I See, e.g., W.C.L., 685 P.2d at 182 (finding statements would have been admis-
sible under residual rule after rejecting admissibility under excited utterance or medical
exceptions); Posten, 302 N.W.2d at 641 (admitting child's utterances spoken during a
nightmare); McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d at 162 (admitting statements made to teachers and
psychiatrist during play with anatomically correct dolls under residual rule). But see
Brown, 341 N.W.2d at 14-15 (refusing to admit pretrial identification from photographic
array under residual rule); Souder, 719 S.W.2d at 734-35 (finding that pointing and
demonstrations to social worker dunng play with dolls would not have qualified under
residual rule requirements).
1 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
"17 The most significant requirement is that the statement must possess
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to that of state-
ments admitted under one of the traditional hearsay exceptions (the first
twenty-three exceptions contained in Rule 803 and the first four exceptions
contained in Rule 804(b)). In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of a
prior statement, the courts look to several criteria: (I) certainty that the
statement was made, which should include, where appropriate, an assess-
ment of the credibility of the person testifying in court to the existence of
the statement; (2) assurance of the declarant's personal knowledge of the
underlying event or condition; (3) whether the statement was made under
oath; (4) the practical availability of the declarant at trial for meaningful
cross-examination concerning the underlying event or condition [obviously
inapplicable to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5)]; and finally, (5) an ad
hoc ascertainment of trustworthiness based upon the totality of the sur-
rounding circumstances. Relevant factors which bear upon such ascertain-
ment of trustworthiness include: (1) the declarant's partiality (interest, bias,
corruption, or coercion); (2) the presence or absence of time to fabricate;
(3) suggestiveness brought on by the use of leading questions; and (4)
whether the declarant has ever reaffirmed or recanted the statement. In
child sexual abuse cases, the court should also consider whether the child's
statement: (1) discloses an embarassing event; (2) is a cry for help; (3)
employs appropriate child-like language; or (4) describes an act of sexual
contact that the child is not likely to realize is either possible or sexually
gratifying to an adult unless actually experienced by the child. The age and
maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the sexual contact, the
physical and mental condition of the child when the statement was made,
and the relationship of the child and the accused are also appropriately
considered. On the other hand, the court should also consider whether the
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factors, 58 one approach has been to find that the " 'indicia of
reliability' referred to by the Roberts Court and 'the circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness' language in the residual
exception to the hearsay rule are synonymous."' 159
The trial court, in deternining the sufficiency of the indicia
of reliability, should consider the age and maturity of the child,
the nature and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the
child to the offender, the reliability of the assertions and the
reliability of the child witness. A young child is unlikely to
fabricate a graphic account of sexual activity because such
activity is beyond the realm of his or her expenence.160
Under this approach, a court might consider the reason for
the child declarant's unavailability within its analysis of the
statement's reliability. However, the assumption that a young
child is unlikely to fabricate may allow the court to overlook
the possibility that a third party could have helped the child to
interpret an innocent act as sexual abuse. 61
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico analyzed the admis-
sibility of hearsay statements in exemplary fashion in State v
Taylor 162 To determine whether the statements had the requisite
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,'" 163 the
court tested them against the four primary hearsay dangers:
ambiguity, lack of candor, faulty memory, and misperception. 16
While the court found the statement of the event of abuse
reliable, it would not admit the statement identifying the per-
statement may have resulted from suggestiveness or command by an adult
close to the child.
Graham, Indicia, supra note 114 at 27-28 (emphasis added). See generally Grant, The
Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness Standard for Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(24), 90 DIcK. L. REv. 75 (1985-86) (recommending standards by Wigmore
and others).
I' See supra notes 25-26.
19 McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d at 163.
160 Id. at 164.
16 See supra note 118.
M' 704 P.2d 443 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
6 See supra notes 25-26.
I" Taylor, 704 P.2d at 451; see text accompanying note 72.
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petrator because ambiguity, faulty memory, and misperception
clearly endangered the statement's trustworthiness. 165
The most troublesome requirement for introducing out-of-
court statements by unavailable children under the residual rule
is that "the statement [be] more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts." 166 If m-court testimony
would be more probative than the extra-judicial statement, "[ilt
would seem that 'reasonable efforts' would include calling the
child-declarant to the witness stand and eliciting the desired
testimony "167
C. Special Statutory Exceptions 68
Professor Graham noted the rapid adoption of new hearsay
exceptions for statements by child victims of sexual abuse: "In
1982, only two states had special statutory exceptions (Kansas
and Washington), whereas eighteen states had adopted such
"' Taylor, 704 P.2d at 452. The court noted that "the child named no less than
five perpetrators." Id. The guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those that justify
the firmly rooted exceptions "relate solely to the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement
itself." Huff, 609 F.2d at 293 (wrongful death case).
The specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are not justified by any circum-
stantial guarantee that the witness who reports the statement will do so
accurately and truthfully. That witness can be cross-examined and Ins
credibility thus tested in the same way as that of any other witness. It is
the hearsay declarant, not the witness who reports the hearsay, who cannot
be cross-examned.
Id.
166 Far. R. Evm. 803(24)(B); see id. 804(b)(5)(B).
167 Traficanti & Bowers, The Substantive Use of Prior Statements in Child Abuse
Trials, 26 A.F L. REv. 83, 101 (1987). This problem arises when the child is not called
because "of a decision not to subject the child to the ngors of tnal or where the
prosecutor anticipates that the child will recant her testimony." Id. at 101 n.191; see
supra note 90.
The suggestion has been made that in this situation, the burden is on the defendant
to call the child as a witness "if he thought her testimony would be in [ns] best
interest." Robinson, 735 P.2d at 813 n.15. See Mlymec & Daily, See No Evil? Can
Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the
Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. Mrim L. REv 115 (1985-86).
168 Due to the popularity of these enactments because of adrmssibility problems
under previously existing exceptions to the hearsay rule, a full discussion of this legislative
response to the need for child hearsay statements is beyond the scope of this article.
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exceptions by October, 1985."169 That number has grown to at
least twenty-six as of June, 1987 170
The Washington statute71  has been recommended as a
model 72 and is similar to other recommended provisions. 173 Be-
cause these statutes incorporate some of the requirements of the
residual rules'74 for statements made by an unavailable child
169 Graham, Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The Current State of the Art, 40 U.
MiAw LAw REv. 1, 7 (1985-86). The author recommended: "[L]egal reforms should be
narrowly drawn to apply only when clearly necessary." Id. at 6.
11 Telephone interview with Howard Davidson of the National Legal Resource
Center of Child Advocacy and Protection (July 10, 1987). He added California, Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania to the list found
zd. at 7 n.9. See generally Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need
to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HAzv J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 539 (1985)
(noting counterproductive effect of related child abuse laws which employ imprecise
definitions and lack standards); Bulkley, supra note 50, at 647-48 ("Although one may
accept the need to reform laws and legal procedures, the assumptions and purposes
underlying proposals need to be exanuned, and the legal and practical consequences
should be analyzed thoroughly before states adopt innovative approaches "); Com-
ment, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual
Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SouuN L. Rnv 387 (1983-84) [hereinafter
Comment, Confronting Child Victims].
"7 A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any
act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not
otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in
dependency proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings in
the courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the
jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) is unavailable as a witness: Provided, that when the child is una-
vailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is
corroborative evidence of the act.
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent
of the statement makes known to the adverse party hIs intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance
of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet the statement.
WASH. Rnv. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis in original).
172 See Note, Comprehensive Approach, supra note 1, at 1766.
'"I See NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, RECOMMENDATiONS, supra note 42, Urm.
R. Evi. 807, 13A U.LA. 64 (Supp. 1987) at 35; infra note 174.
174 A statement made by a child, when under the age of -, [sic] describing
an act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is
admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, and de-
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declarant, the reliability analysis may follow along smillar lines.Y5
The reliability of the child victim will be considered generally, 76
and if the surrounding circumstances do not indicate sufficient
reliability, the statements will not be admitted,1 77 consistent with
the dictates of Ohio v Roberts.17
Relying on a similar statute, the Kansas Supreme Court
remanded a case to the trial court for findings of fact on
reliability, including that "the child was not induced to make
the statement falsely "179 One last common safeguard worthy of
note is the requirement of additional corroborative evidence. 80
pendency and deliquency proceedings in juvenile court if:
(2) The testimony of the child is unavailable at the trial or hearing and the
statement
(a) was made by a child possessing personal knowledge of the sexual
conduct described, and
(b) the statement possesses circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
eqivalent to that possessed by statements admitted pursuant to a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, and
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant, sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, provided further,
(d) there is adequate corroborative evidence introduced at tnal of the
act of sexual contact described in the statement.
Graham, Indicia, supra note 114, at 48-49.
"IS Id. at 53-55. Professor Graham adds or emphasizes the following factors which
bear on trustworthiness: "(3) the physical and mental condition of the child when the
statement was made; (4) suggestiveness, brought on by the use of leading questions
coupled with an evaluation of the child's relationslup to the questioner, considered in
light of surrounding circumstances." Id. at 54; see supra note 157.
176 Glendenng, 503 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (citing requirement
of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23)(a)(1) (Supp. 1987)).
'7 Griffith, 727 P.2d at 253 (noting that child only accused defendant after two
hours of questioning by mother, and in response to question, "Did Daddy do this to
you?").
7, See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
17 State v. Lanter, 699 P.2d 503, 505 (Kan. 1985).
11 See, e.g., supra note 174; State v. Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
The corroboration requirement stems from a due process concern that the
trier of fact may be too willing to convict an accused sexual offender, that
is, find that the state has satisfied its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, on the basis of evidence of alleged out of court statements of
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But "corroboration that abuse-occurred does not lend particular
trustworthiness to the child's statement regarding the identity of
the abuser, usually a central issue at trial."' 1
In summary, while those who drafted some of the special
hearsay exceptions have attempted to cure hearsay dangers pres-
ent when the defendant is unable to cross-examine his or her
accuser, the discretion of the judge in reliability analysis can still
be influenced by notions about the inherent trustworthiness of
children's statements about sexual abuse.112 Considerations of
why the declarant is unavailable may be subsumed within the
reliability analysis under both the residual rule and the special
statutory exceptions. But there is no guarantee that a judge can
or will detect the basis for erroneous allegations as a preliminary
admissibility matter.
CONCLUSION
When critical evidence in a child sexual abuse prosecution is
available only through statements of the child witness, the child
should testify if possible.13 If the child's powers of observation,
memory and narration were and are substantially intact, and the
children that describe socially repugnant sexual conduct.
Graham, Indicia, supra note 114, at 58. But see Ryan, 691 P.2d at 204 (concluding that
corroboration cannot supply adequate mdicia of reliability).
-8 Comment, Confronting Child Victims, supra note 170 at 402.
If the prosecution has strong corroboration of the abuse, there is little
need for hearsay. If, however, the evidence is inconclusive, the state may
need the hearsay to prove its case. When the state's case is weak, the
defendant is most vulnerable to the dangers posed by the hearsay and in
greater need of hIs confrontation rights. Thus, the greater the threat to the
defendant's rights, the more likely the prosecution will be to use the Act
to admit the hearsay. The result will be to use the Act mainly in instances
where it will tend to undermine a defendant's right to confrontation.
Id.
rn See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Note, Two Legislative
Innovations, supra note 1, at 819-20 (commenting that-the opinion that '"kids dont lie
about things like that" could fulfill the requirement of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness").
1 See, e.g., Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 641-42 (5th-Cir. 1979) (murder);
Ketcham v. State, 162 N.E.2d 247, 249 (Ind. 1959) (rape), State v. R.W., 514 A.2d
1287, 1292 (N.J. 1986) (sexual'assault of a minor), State v. Faster, 524 A.2d 587, 590-
91 (R.I. 1987) (sexual assault); State v. Ryan, 691 P:2d 197, 208 (Wash. 1984) (indecent
liberties) (Dimmick, J., concurring); see also supra note 90.
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child shows practical understanding of the need for truthfulness,
his or her testimonial capacity is sufficient.'84 The burden on the
court of determining competency can hardly compare with that
of determining the reliability of out-of-court statements,18 5 es-
pecially when they are offered under an exception which is not
"firmly rooted,"' 1 6
If the child testifies, the defendant will have an opportunity
to explore matters such as confusion about the identity of the
perpetrator or the possibility that the characterization of the
event as sexual abuse originated not in the mind of the child,
but in that of a parent or social worker. The judge may control
the course of cross-examination should it become abusive.
When a child's competency is challenged, or the prosecutor
declines to call the child for psychological protection, or his
unavailability is stipulated, the judge should hold a hearing and
make findings on the record. "Holding a hearing ensures factual
support for the trial court's finding and gives an appellate court
a basis with which to uphold the trial court's determination."'' 1
If the child is found incompetent or truly unavailable for
psychological reasons, 88 and hearsay statements by the child are
offered and challenged, the court should conduct a full inquiry
into the statements' reliability For admissibility under any ex-
ception, the court should consider all relevant criteria, including
the basis for the child's unavailability and how that might bear
on reliability, and the possibility that a domestic dispute or some
other external influence might be the source of the child's alle-
gations.
The judge should return to the underlying rationales of the
hearsay rule and the confrontation clause as a final check on
admissibility. If cross-examination of the declarant would have
served to expose the untrustworthiness of the out-of-court state-
ment, denial of the right to confrontation is clear constitutional
error. 8 9 The court's analysis of the statement's trustworthiness
214 See supra notes 49-50.
" See supra notes 158-60, 171-75 and accompanying text.
" Oluo v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
8 Bulkley, supra note 50 at 653. The Washington statute-based special hearsay
exceptions mcrporate this requirement; see supra note 171.
I See FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(4).
1 Ryan, 691 P.2d at 205 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).
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also should be made on the record, 19° so that the factors consid-
ered will be available for appellate review
Only reliable hearsay should be admitted in any case. A
repugnant charge "does not destroy the presumption of
innocence" 191 or justify a conviction based on untrustworthy or
incompetent evidence.
JoEllen S. McComb*
1,0 State v, Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983); State v. Lanter, 699 P.2d 503,
505 (Kan. 1985).
" Jones v. United States, 231 F.2d 44, 246 (DC. Cir. 1956).
* The author would like to express her apprboation to Dean Robert G. Lawson
for is suggestions and support.
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